Introduction
In recent years, the Internet has developed rapidly, and many Internet transaction applications have become popular. For example, many public construction engineering projects now conform to public, fair and efficient requirements via Internet technology. For example, in e-bidding cases, some important issues should be of concern. The bidding price should be protected to defend against insider attack, and there should be a fair arbitration mechanism to arbitrate accusations.
In 1983, Simmons [15] [16] [17] first proposed the subliminal channel mechanism. Subliminal channels are employed for secret communication; they can be used to deliver subliminal messages between sender and receiver. Subliminal messages cannot be accessed except through the specific receiver. In 1997, Harn and Gong [5] proposed a digital signature using a subliminal channel; they showed how to construct a digital signature scheme with a broadband subliminal channel that does not require a subliminal receiver to share the transmitter's secret signing key. In 2010, Lin et al. [9] proposed a digital signature with multiple subliminal channels, and its applications. The proposed scheme has the advantage that the subliminal receivers cannot forge a valid signature since they do not share the signer's secret key. It can also provide more than one independent subliminal message.
In 1998, Subramanian [18] presented the design and verification of a secure electronic auction protocol. This protocol ensured anonymity, security, privacy, atomicity and low overhead. Hwang et al. [6] proposed adding timestamps to the secure electronic auction protocol in 2002. They found the drawback of Subramanian's protocol and proposed an electronic auction protocol with improved robustness. In 2006, Liaw et al. [8] proposed an electronic online bidding auction protocol with both improved security and efficiency. This protocol not only satisfies the requirements for the electronic auction properties of anonymity, security, privacy, atomicity and low overhead cost, but also adds the properties of non-repudiation, untraceability, auditablity, one-time registration and unlinkability. In 2008, Chun et al. [3] proposed a bidder-anonymous English auction scheme with privacy and public verifiability. The proposed scheme provided the following security features: anonymity, traceability, no framing, unforgeability, non-repudiation, fairness, public verifiability, unlinkability among various auction rounds, linkability within a single auction round, bidding efficiency, one-time registration, and easy revocation. In 2012, Xiong et al. [19] proposed a bidder-anonymous English auction protocol based on revocable ring signature. The proposed protocol has three appealing characteristics: first, it offers conditional privacy-preservation: while the auctioneer can verify that a bidder is an authorized participant in the system, only the collaboration of auctioneer and registration manager can reveal the true identity of a malicious bidder. Second, it is a one-time registration: the bidder can take part in plural auctions with one time registration. Third, it is spontaneous: the bidder can bid without interaction with the auctioneer and other bidders. Fan et al. [4] proposed a multi-recastable e-bidding game with dual-blindness. The proposed protocol allows all participants to take part in a sequence of different auctions for various products unlimitedly after performing a onetime registration, where the winner does not need to re-register either. They formally proved the security of the proposed scheme and also provided comparisons to show that it was the most efficient one, compared with previous works. In order to defend against known attacks, some applications should embed authentication mechanisms [10] [11] to ensure that security requirements can also be guaranteed.
Due to the rapid development of the Internet, many Internet applications have recently become very widely used. Internet security has therefore become an important issue. This paper proposes an electronic public engineering project bidding protocol via a subliminal channel. In the proposed scheme, the subliminal channel can protect a bidder's interests, while allowing an official agent to make a fair arbitration. The proposed scheme is non-repudiable, untraceable and offers fair arbitration of public engineering projects, but is also resistant to replay, forgery and insider attacks, thus enhancing both security and fairness.
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The proposed scheme should have the following characteristics:
The following notations are used in the proposed protocol:
,
. 
.
: the ith signature pair
: the timestamp generated by X, and trans-
: the subliminal message 
Figure 1
The overview of our scheme 
The Registration Phase
In the proposed scheme, the encryption and decryption mechanism is used to protect messages, based on the ElGamal scheme. The BI and PCC need to register with the bank (BK) and proxy server (PS). Then, the bank and proxy server store the BI and PCC's identities: ID BI and ID PCC , respectively. After this, the participating parties receive their private and public keys.
Therefore, the participating parties can select their own private keys: x BI , x BK , x PCC , x PS and x OA . It can then compute the responding public key.
Step 1: The BI, BK, PCC, PS and OA choose their private keys x BI , x BK , x PCC , x PS and x OA , respectively. Then these parties compute public keys y BI , y BK , y PCC , y PS and y OA , respectively, as follows:
The Bidding Phase
The BI sends the bidding bonds to the bank (BK), and then the BK returns the response message to the BI. After this, the BI sends the blind message to the PCC to sign it, and the PCC returns the blind message. The BI then sends the bidding message to the PS. The bidding phase is shown in Figure 2 .
Step 1: The BI computes the bidding bonds message M BI-BK :
The BI then chooses a random number r 1 and computes the ciphertexts C 1 and C 2 as follows:
The BI then sends the ciphertexts (C 1 , C 2 ) to the BK.
Step 2: Upon receiving the ciphertexts (C 1 , C 2 ), the BK uses the private key x BK to decrypt the message:
. It sends a blind signature request message M req to the PCC.
Step 4: The PCC chooses a random number k and computes parameter
The PCC sends the parameter Step 5: The BI chooses random numbers (a, b, c) and computes:
is then sent to the PCC to sign the message.
Step 6: The PCC computes: (20) and then sends
to the BI.
Step 7: After receiving the blind signature
, the BI decrypts the blind message and obtains the signature: It chooses a random number r 3 and computes ciphertexts (C 3 , C 4 ): It sends the ciphertexts (C 3 , C 4 ) to the PS.
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Step 8: After receiving the ciphertext (C 3 , C 4 ), the PS uses the private key x PS to decrypt the messages C 3 and C 4 :
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4 ? mod . 4 4 4 ? mod After this, the PS sends the signature (d 3 , s 3 ) and message M PS-BI to the BI.
Step 9: Upon receiving the signature (d 3 , s 3 ) and message M PS-BI , the BI verifies the signature as follows: 
The Bidding Phase
After the deadline of the casting bid, PS sends the blind factor to the PCC. The PCC then uses the blind factor to obtain the bidding price. After this, the PCC publishes the winner. The scenario of the opening bid phase is shown in Figure 3 .
Step 1: The PS chooses a random number k 2 , and creates a message M PSV (where The scenario of the opening bid phase ( , ,  , The PS then creates a bidding message: Next it chooses a random number r 4 and computes ciphertexts (C 5 , C 6 ): It then sends the ciphertexts (C 5 , C 6 ) to the PCC.
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Step 2: After receiving the ciphertexts (C 5 , C 6 ), the PCC uses the private key x PCC to decrypt the message: The PCC verifies if the bidding message is valid or not: The PCC then chooses a random number r 6 and computes ciphertexts (C 9 , C 10 ): Figure 4 The overview of the arbitration phase (PCC is accused) 
